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THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE WINTERS
DOCTRINE
RICHARD B. COLLINS*
In a sense this is an easy prediction, and I don't need Jeane
Dixon's help to make it. The Winters decision' was seventy-seven
years old in January, and it announced a rule of real property law. No
court would change a rule of this nature without an extraordinary jus-
tification, and nothing of that kind has appeared or is likely to. If
Congress attempted a major revision of the Winters rule, the Supreme
Court would honor it short of an unconstitutional taking. 2 But a con-
gressional revision seems even less likely.
We could be more confident of the future if the Indian nations
had been able to put more of their water rights to use. It is most
unlikely that Congress or the Court would impair Indian investmests
in water-using developments. Lack of developed water uses on Indian
lands is the principal source of instability for the Winters doctrine.
Under state or federal water law in the West, junior owners of surface
water rights are entitled to use any water that senior owners are not
actually using.3 All over the West, surface water to which Indian na-
tions have a prior right is ' lawfully being used by others. There are
similar groundwater uses. Some of these uses have lasted for many
years, raising expectations that Indian water will continue to be avail-
able to junior users. As a result, the most effective way to suppress
Indian water claims has been to minimize the development of Indian
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. B.A., 1960, Yale University;
LL.B., 1966, Harvard University. This is the edited text of an address to the Conference on Indian
Water in the American West: A Planning Agenda for the Future, sponsored by the American Indian
Lawyer Training Program at Scottsdale, Arizona, November 29-30, 1984. Edie T. Cole provided valu-
able research assistance.
i. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The Court held that the treaties, agreements,
and statutes setting aside the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana implicitly reserved to the
tribes of that reservation sufficient unappropriated water from a river forming the reservation's bound-
ary to meet the Indians' reasonable needs. This holding as developed in later decisions of the Court is
commonly called the Winters doctrine. See generally D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 291-
332 (1984); F. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 575-604 (1982). On the background of
the Winters case, see Hundley, The "Winters" Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery Reexam-
ined, 13 W. HIST. Q. 17 (1982).
2. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407-24 (1980).
3. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 335, 340 (9th Cir. 1956), cert
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Mont. 1968); United
States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 911-12 (D. Idaho 1928).
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lands.4 This situation has generated powerful political and financial
forces that oppose Indian development, of which there has been very
little. There have been extravagant claims of the "threat" posed by
Indian water claims,5 but actual conflict has been almost entirely a
war of words, paper, and lawyers. Indian calls are not shutting any-
one's headgates.
Why then doesn't the unstable situation of undeveloped Winters
water rights threaten the existence of the Winters doctrine? Because
the doctrine is so malleable that its moral foundation could be under-
mined without formally changing the rule.
The Winters doctrine is based on a rule of fairness that the
Supreme Court has historically followed. Contrary to critics' charges,
this was not an ad hoc rule created for the Winters case. By the time
of Winters in 1908, the Court had firmly established its rule that In-
dian laws and treaties should be construed favorably to the Indians.6
While the rule has several forms,7 the underlying principle is the same
for all of them. At an early date, the Court decided that the Constitu-
tion gave Congress broad power to legislate over the Indian nations.
But Congress was often beholden to the Indians' deadliest enemies,
and its authority was unchecked by any political power of the Indi-
ans.9 Except when tribes could resist militarily, the Indians were sub-
ject to congressional power tempered only by occasional voices of
popular opinion in the states far removed from the frontier.10
The Court perceived that this unchecked power was the antithesis
of the principle of consent of the governed that is a basic ideal of this
Nation. Thus while recognizing Congress's power, the Court evolved
the rule that the power must be used explicitly and openly. The Court
will not sanction dissembling about the technical meaning of agree-
ments with the Indians or of laws imposed on them. Treaties and laws
will be construed on the assumption that Congress intended to deal
honorably with the Indian nations, even when evidence suggests baser
4. See Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States, 13 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 377, 389 (1978).
5. Eg., National Law Journal, Feb. 18, 1985, at 1 col. 3 ("the West's darkest and most tumultu-
ous legal storm cloud"); Shrago, Emerging Indian Water Right" An Analysis of Recent Judicial and
Legislative Developments, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1105, 1116 (1980).
6. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-54
(1832).
7. See Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogations" "As Long as Water
Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 617
(1975).
8. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562 (1832).
9. Most Indians were not allowed to vote until the early twentieth century. F. COHEN, supra note
I, at 639-45.
10. F. PRUCHA, AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS 4-5 (1973).
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motives of some members.1 Both will be construed to sustain the In-
dians' reasonable expectations at the time the laws or treaties were
made.
The Winters facts made out an obvious and compelling occasion
for the application of this principle. Justice McKenna's opinion spoke
openly of the "conflict of implications" raised by the agreements and
laws setting aside the Fort Belknap Reservation along the Milk River,
and the Court chose the construction favorable to the tribes. 12 Later
the Court established that a water right will be implied for all Indian
and other federal reservations when necessary to carry out reservation
purposes.'
3
The amount of water reserved is the other great question
presented by the Winters doctrine. Winters was an injunctive action to
protect the Indians' water uses at the time of suit, but the Court's
theory was that the tribes had a prior right to enough water for the
reservation's reasonable needs. " This open-ended standard included
additional water as the Indians' needs increased.' 5 It interfered with
water planning by everyone else, including the United States. The fed-
eral government solved its problems by filing quiet title lawsuits to
quantify the unused part of the Winters right,' 6 but other claimants
faced the barrier of sovereign immunity. 17 Congress responded by
consenting to suits brought against the United States to quiet title to
federal and Indian water rights.'"
In quiet title cases, the Supreme Court decided that a fair ex-
change for the Indians' uncertain future water rights would require a
generous present allocation but a permanent one. Under the circum-
stances of the lower Colorado River adjudication, the Court sustained
its special master's award to the tribes of enough water to irrigate all
the practicably irrigable land within the reservations.' 9 In other
words, the tribes were decreed a present right to the maximum water
allocation they could have claimed under the future needs theory of
11. E.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 380-84, 407-24 (1980).
12. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
13. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963).
14. Winters, 143 F. 740, 749 (9th Cir. 1906), aff'd, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
15. Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1908). See Winters, 207 U.S. at
576.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1289-95 (9th Cir.
1981) (describing trial court proceedings between 1913-1944), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.,
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
17. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1963).
18. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
19. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), de-
cree amended, 383 U.S. 268 (1966), supplemental decree entered, 439 U.S. 419 (1979), modified, 460
U.S. 605 (1983).
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Winters, according to the best evidence of this allocation available at
the time of the lawsuit. But the Court has resisted tribes' attempts to
increase their allocations based on newly discovered facts.20
Whether the Court will adhere to the quantification standard
adopted in the Colorado River case is not as certain as the Court's
continued adherence to Winters. The Colorado River is an extraordi-
nary water source, and other cases may offer ways to distinguish the
Colorado River decision. Last year the Court made a cryptic sugges-
tion that it might reconsider the question in a proper case.21 Yet it is
much more likely that the irrigable acres standard will be retained.
One reason the standard will be retained is that it is quite adapta-
ble. To quantify Indian water rights that are not yet developed, a
court must calculate reservation acres that would be practicably irriga-
ble if put to use. Evidence is based on hypothetical development plans
drawn up by expert witnesses for the Indians.22 This calculation can
yield dramatically different results based on a court's discretionary
choice among several variables. Two that are especially interesting are
the cost of capital needed to develop an irrigation system and the effi-
ciency of water use to be required.
Let us compare these variables with the same factors for non-
Indian developments. Government capital for non-Indian irrigation
developments in the West has been supplied at well below market
prices since passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902.23 Recent federal
deficits and high real interest rates have stopped any expansion of
these subsidies, and there is no early prospect of their return. Will
Indian water rights be calculated based on this new austerity or on the
former easy money regime that has capitalized non-Indian develop-
ments? Or will the courts simply manipulate this variable to achieve a
20. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. at 615-28.
21. Id. at 625-26. When the Court adopted the practicably irrigable acreage standard, it rejected
alternative proposals based on the actual Indian reservation population at the time of adjudication.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 597, 600-01. See also 460 U.S. at 617. In recent years, opponents of
Indian claims have advanced some sort of equitable apportionment as an alternative standard. The
Court expressly rejected this standard in Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976). Its
advocacy continues, however. See National Law Journal, Feb. 18, 1985, at 50 col. 1; Shrago, Emerging
Indian Water Rights: An Analysis of Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments, 26 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 1105, 1114-17 (1980).
22. See Report of the Special Master 155-205 (Dec. 15, 1982), General Adjudication of All Rights
to Use of Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, No. 4993 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. decree
entered May 10, 1983), modified, No. 101-234 (Jun. 8, 1984)(hereinafter cited as Big Horn River
Adjudication).
23. See Sax, Federal Reclamation Law, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 110.2 (R. Clark ed.
1967); Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights. A Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 13 (1965).
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result that seems fair on particular facts?2 4
Efficiency of water use is another pliable standard. Water use effi-
ciency in the West has historically been low.2 5 The prior appropria-
tion doctrine of western state water law confines water rights to
"beneficial uses," but these are broadly defined.2 6 Once water is put to
beneficial use, traditional prior appropriation law tends to reward inef-
ficient uses. 2 7 Theoretically, wasted water is not beneficially used, but
in practice this has been a lax standard that condones all but the most
egregiously wasteful practices.2 8
Recently some states have sought to combat waste by imposing
stricter conservation requirements. 29  The question posed by this
change is whether Indian water rights will be calculated based on the
newly discovered conservation ethic or on the tradition of unlined
ditches and flooded fields. In the Big Horn River Adjudication in Wy-
oming, the state seeks to require an efficiency standard for Indian uses
greater than any actual standard historically achieved in the state.30
Although the court has so far not agreed with the state, the example
shows how the efficiency variable can be manipulated in calculating
undeveloped Indian water rights. Moreover, a stiff efficiency standard
for Indian rights would require greater capital investment in technol-
ogy such as laser leveling and sprinklers, so these two variables are
related.
When other adjudication variables are considered as well,3 the
flexibility enjoyed by a quantifying court is very great indeed. If this
flexibility is used only to take account of particular facts, and the basic
standard remains fair to the Indian nations, they will not have cause to
complain. But there is an opportunity for manipulation that would
formally honor Winters but strip it of moral content.
In theory the flexibility can work both ways, and a quantifying
court can award Indian nations water to irrigate their mountain tops.
24. See Report of the Special Master, Big Horn River Adjudication, supra note 22, at 198-204;
Burness, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, Practicably Irrigable Acreage and Economic Feasibility:
The Role of Time, Ethics, and Discounting, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 289 (1983).
25. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION REPORT, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 299-306
(1973).
26. Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in State Water-Rights Law, in 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 19.3 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
27. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REv. 483, 486-91
(1982).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 488-89 n.23; Higdon & Thompson, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Code,
1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 628.
30. See Report of the Special Master, Big Horn River Adjudication, supra note 22, at 134-39, 180-
82.
31. Report of the Special Master, supra note 22, at 155-205; Burness, et al., supra note 24.
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In reality this does not occur. The Supreme Court's standard of fair-
ness in Indian cases has never made an Indian rich. Lest anyone think
it might, the Court recently warned in a treaty fishing case that Indi-
ans are entitled to no more than a "moderate living" from their treaty
rights to fish.32 We always knew that. It was gratuitous and bad form
to announce it in print.
The question, then, is whether the Winters doctrine will continue
to allocate a fair share of water to Indian reservations, or whether its
variables will be manipulated so that Indians receive only a minimal
allocation. Manipulation might originate in Congress or the Court.
But Congress is unlikely to interfere with judicial allocation unless the
Court is overly generous to the tribes, and that is not going to happen.
What of the Court? The lesson of history, never conclusive, tells
us that the Court will stay the course and not retreat from the sub-
stance of the Winters doctrine. The Court has been remarkably con-
stant on Indian matters. It did not prevent George Tassell's
hanging,33 the removal policy,34 Sand Creek,35 Wounded Knee,36 the
Dawes Act,37 or Oklahoma, 3" but these were beyond its power. When
it has had jurisdiction, the Court has seldom been clearly unfair to
Indians. Indeed, the number of justices who lacked a reasonable grasp
of the Court's principle of fairness in Indian cases can be counted on
one hand, such memorables as Henry Baldwin, dissenter in Worcester
v. Georgia,39 David Brewer, dissenter in Winters,4" and Stanley Reed,
author of several neo-manifest destiny opinions in the 1940s and
'50s.4 It would be a remarkable change if a future Court were to have
32. Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979). See also id. at 685 (Indians
entitled to meet their "reasonable livelihood needs").
33. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV.
500, 512-13 (1969).
34. See G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL (1932).
35. See A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES, 162-64, 166, 184, 191,
195, 286-87 (1970).
36. See id. at 244-46, 265.
37. See id. at 252-306.
38. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 770-74.
39. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595-96 (1832)(Baldwin, J., dissenting). See also Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 31-50 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
40. 207 U.S. at 578 (Brewer, J., dissenting without opinion). Presumably Justice Brewer dissented
based on conflicts between Winters and dicta in his opinion for the Court in Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907).
41. Justice Reed attempted to recast the Court's rules of construction in Indian cases into a re-
dundant restatement of the search for congressional intent. Northwestern Band of Shoshone Indians v.
United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353 (1945). See also Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 11 (1956) (Reed, J.,
dissenting); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281-91 (1955). I would add the first
Justice White, author of Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) and dissenter in United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905) (White, J., dissenting), but he came around in Winters.
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a majority of such as these.
If the Winters doctrine endures, how will it be affected by the
changes in western water law and policy that Charles Wilkinson has
described?42 I have already mentioned the relationship of capital sub-
sidies and water use efficiency to quantification of Winters rights. But
quantification is based on the original purposes of reservations, so it
may be proper to disregard modern policy trends. This does not mean
that tribes should ignore environmental and conservation concerns.
Provided they share in its gains, Indian nations have every reason to
support the move toward greater efficiency and conservation of water
resources. This policy can generate the water savings needed to re-
duce conflict between Indians and their neighbors, and it is a natural
ally of tribal water claims to sustain fisheries.43
Indian attitudes toward the water conservation movement may be
affected by the answer to a legal question about Winters water rights.
If tribes may initiate conservation measures and benefit by devoting
water saved to different uses, we can expect strong tribal support for
conservation. However, if water saved passes to junior appropriators,
tribes will have little incentive to invest in water conservation."
Pressures to quantify Indian water rights will continue, and quan-
tification will be achieved by all methods known to our legal system,
including adjudication, negotiated settlement, and legislation. In some
cases the process will be eased by construction of new water projects
that supply enough developed water for everyone's needs. Winters
claims may provide a sufficient impetus to overcome federal reluctance
to fund new water projects. Indian nations, states, and private inter-
ests have a common interest in pressing this view on Washington.
They are already doing so in order to work out aspects of the Central
Arizona Project,45 and common projects are possible in several other
states.
Cost is a major obstacle to quantification of Indian water rights.
Most water rights quantifications are expensive lawsuits because of
42. See Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 317 (1985).
43. Shupe, supra note 27, at 517-18.
44. Under traditional state prior appropriation law, water saved may be put to other uses on the
land to which it is appurtenant but not on other land. D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL
118-20, 135-38 (1984). If this rule were applied to tribes, it would raise an interesting question about
the scope of the appurtenant land limitation.
45. See Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat.
1274 (1982). Congress is now aware of Winters and may take it into account in laws to reserve new
lands for tribes. But no one expects new reservations to be large, and new priority dates are not
valuable.
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large numbers of necessary parties.46 The expense is increased signifi-
cantly when courts must face the technical difficulties of measuring
practicably irrigable acreage in the absence of actual development.47
In recent cases, the federal government has borne the lion's share of
technical costs, and states have provided legal representation for many
small private owners. A fit of austerity at either level of government
could jeopardize this scheme in future cases. When tribes believe the
government is not adequately presenting their cases, they face difficult
choices because of the prohibitive cost of participation. Nevertheless,
the present system is likely to continue, its costs perhaps eased by
some negotiated settlements. The key factor is the requirement that
suit be brought by or against the United States by name in order to
quantify Indian water rights.48 This sets in motion the traditional ad-
versary machinery of the Justice Department, a process that would be
difficult to alter.
Some Indian nations have opposed quantification of their water
rights. I believe this view to be mistaken. Undeveloped and unquanti-
fled Winters rights are abstract, which makes it easy for junior users to
dismiss Winters rights as the "Indian problem." Quantified water
rights seem much more a real commodity, which competing users
must reckon with. And quantified rights will more readily attract de-
velopment capital.
Transfer of Winters water rights will become an increasingly
prominent issue. Whenever Indian resources have been in great
enough demand, Congress has come up with ways to allow or compel
tribes to alienate their property. Many of these schemes have been
disastrous for Indians.49 Water rights have been an exception because
junior owners can enjoy the resource in the absence of Indian develop-
ment. 0 The parties interested in maintaining the status quo have not
been the Indian nations but those who have used water to which the
tribes have a prior right. Lacking the usual political pressures to allow
alienation, Congress has not authorized tribes to sell Winters water
rights.51
More recently, pressures to authorize tribes to sell or lease Win-
ters rights have arisen, and they will grow. The state and- federal gov-
46. Clyde, Practical Aspects of Water Litigation and General Adjudication Proceedings, 6 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 297, 530 (R. Clark ed. 1972).
47. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
49. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 136-38.
50. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
51. But see infra note 52 and accompanying text, describing a recent, unique exception for one
tribe. On leasing and changes of use, see infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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ernments favor transferability to assure maximum utilization of water.
Change is evidenced by the recent Papago water settlement statute,
which authorizes alienation by the tribe.52 Although Indian nations
had reason to oppose past schemes to alienate their land, they will
want the right to sell or lease water rights, in order to generate capital
to finance development projects.
Existing law on transfer of Indian water rights is uncertain.
Water rights are real property subject to the general restraint against
alienation of tribal land.53 Although no statute explicitly authorizes
lease or sale of tribal water rights, there is a longstanding view, sup-
ported by a few legal authorities, that the laws permitting leases of
Indian land implicitly allow water rights to be leased for use with the
land.54 At least this is the rule when water rights are leased for the
same uses that define the tribal right.
The Supreme Court has held that owners of Indian allotments
made out of tribal lands have a right to use some part of the reserva-
tion's Winters right.55 This rule is probably based on an implied trans-
fer of a share of the right. The Ninth Circuit has held that allotment
water rights survive sale of allotments to non-Indians.56
There has also been some judicial treatment of the question
whether a tribe may shift use of its Winters right measured by one
purpose, usually irrigation, to another, such as recreation or mining.
The predominant view is that tribes may do so if the water is used
within the same reservation.57 A hypothetical example would be a
tribe's use of its irrigation-defined water right for secondary oil recov-
ery purposes. A few judicial opinions have included dicta announcing
that tribes may not transfer Winters rights outside their reservations. 58
These opinions probably confuse two rather distinct issues. The first is
52. Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1274,
§ 306(c) (1982). The act specifies that it has no effect on the general question whether Winters rights
may be sold for off-reservation use. Id. § 306(d).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982). See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 593.
54. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1921). See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 390, 394, 402a,
415-415d (1982); United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, slip op. at 17-19 (E.D.Wash. Aug. 23, 1982),
affid, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); Memo. Dep.Sol. Int. (Feb. 1, 1964), reprinted in 2 Opinions of the
Solicitor of the Dept. of the Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, at 1930 (Government Print-
ing Office n.d.).
55. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 0939).
56. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984).
57. United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, slip op. at 11-12 (E.D.Wash., Aug. 23, 1982), aff'd, 736
F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); Big Horn River Adjudication, supra note 22, slip op. at 20, 65 (May 10,
1983). See also Coville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S, 1092 (1981), and authorities cited therein; Trelease, Indian Water Rights for Mineral Develop-
ment, in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 230-33 (P. Maxfield ed. 1977).
58. See United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, slip op. at 17-20; Big Horn River Adjudication,
supra note 22, slip op. at 20, 65 (May 10, 1983).
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whether a tribe may shift water uses between portions of its own land
wherever the land is located., The second issue is whether a tribe may
transfer its water right to other parties for use on land it does not own,
wherever located. The latter form of transfer is precluded by the ab-
sence of any applicable waiver of the general restraint on alienation of
tribal real property. 9 The best policy would be for Congress explicitly
to authorize tribes to lease their water rights for periods long enough
for lessees to amortize development investments.
If tribes can shift Winters water rights to different purposes or
transfer them to different users, several other questions may arise.
What uses qualify for transfer-only those defined as beneficial by
state law? One federal court has said no,' but the issue will probably
be contested again. Two uses that may cause controversies are in-
stream uses, such as fishery maintenance in states that still do not rec-
ognize any in-stream uses as beneficial,6 and specifically forbidden
uses such as Montana's prohibition of the use of water to operate
slurry pipelines.62
Another question raised by tribal transfers is the quantity of
water that tribes are allowed to transfer to new places of use. Western
state water laws restrict transfers to protect other water rights holders
including junior owners.6" Indeed, the party wanting to transfer usu-
ally has the burden of proving that the transfer will not harm other
owners.64 Some western states limit interbasin transfers,65 and most of
them try to limit or prohibit interstate transfers of any kind.6 6 Recent
Supreme Court opinions suggest that tribal transfers, if allowed, will
have to be limited to assure protection of junior owners who rely on
return flow or other water not consumed by the purpose defining the
tribal right.67 In practice, this means that only part of a Winters water
right may be transferred. However, other limitations found in state
law ought not apply to tribes.68
The question of who has jurisdiction to administer water rights in
59. See supra notes 51, 53.
60. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
61. See Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progess Report on "New" Pub-
lic Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211.
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104 (1983) (repealed 1985).
63. D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 165-79 (1984).
64. Id. at 166.
65. Id. at 162-65.
66. Id. at 399-400.
67. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620-26 (1983); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128, 141 (1976).
68. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143-46 (1976); Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48, 51-53 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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Indian country has been much debated. Tribes claim that reservation
sovereignty entitles them to exclusive jurisdiction.6 9 States claim juris-
diction based on federal statutory consent and off-reservation effects.7 °
The Ninth Circuit has sustained state jurisdiction under the latter the-
ory,7 1 but the issue will continue to be litigated. In another case the
Ninth Circuit held that a water system entirely within Indian country
was under exclusive tribal jurisdiction.7 2 Tribes have a legitimate con-
cern that states may employ administrative jurisdiction as a means of
imposing substantive state water laws on them.
Several other controversial issues are part of the Winters doc-
trine's future. There has been widespread debate over whether irriga-
ble acreage should be the sole measure of Winters water rights, or
whether other purposes should be recognized as well. The courts have
already recognized some other purposes and will continue to do so.
The Winters opinion itself referred to water for stock watering, domes-
tic use, and even hunting.7 3 However, the courts will probably adhere
to the view that Winters rights must be measured by purposes contem-
plated at the time a reservation was set aside. 74 The principal, original
purpose of many reservations was to sustain an agricultural economy.
Water uses needed to carry out this purpose will be recognized, includ-
ing water to generate hydroelectric power.7 5 Other reservations in-
cluded fisheries relied on by their residents, and water rights for this
purpose will be sustained.76 But the "homeland" argument that water
was reserved for all purposes that contribute to tribal self-sufficiency
69. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51-53 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
70. The statutory argument is based on 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982), which consents to actions against
the United States to determine ownership of water rights. See supra note 18. The statute states that the
United States "shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction."
The issue is whether a decree could bind the United States to state administration after rights have been
adjudicated. In at least one case, the United States has voluntarily agreed to state administration,
although no Indian rights were involoved. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 35
(Colo. 1982).
71. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363-66 (9th Cir. 1984).
•72. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51-53 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
73. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
74. See Report of the Special Master, Big Horn River Adjudication, supra note 22, at 64-71, slip
op. at 14-20,42, 60-63, 69 (May 10, 1983); slip op. at 9-11, 17 (Jun. 8, 1984).
75. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 340 (9th Cir. 1939); United
States v. 5,677.94 Acres of Land, 162 F. Supp. 108 (D. Mont. 1958). See also Federal Power Comm'n
v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 444 (1955); 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 171, 178 (1924).
76. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412-14 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3536
(1984); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada Enters., 713 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 1324 (1984); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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will probably fail." Other users of the same water source could not
have anticipated many important tribal uses. Hence, tribes may have
water rights for oil shale development or water skiing reservoirs only if
their irrigation rights may be transferred to these purposes.7"
An alternative rule that has some indirect support in the case law
would measure reservation purposes at the time tribal water rights are
quantified, rather than at the time a reservation was set aside.79 The
question of the technology by which to measure practicably irrigable
acreage is viewed from the time of litigation. 0
A novel variant of the reservation purposes issue is the theory
that a purpose not contemplated when a reservation was set aside can
become a reservation purpose at a later time. For example, one might
argue that extracting a mineral that had not been discovered when a
reservation was set aside became a reservation purpose when the min-
eral was discovered, or when mining began, or when water was first
used in the mining process. According to this theory, the tribe would
then have a federal reservation water right for this purpose with a pri-
ority based on the date when the use became known or began.8 ' The
theory resembles the controversial claim of federal proprietary water
rights based on actual use raised by the Carter administration and re-
pudiated by the Reagan administration. 2 The theory avoids the fore-
seeability problem presented if the new use is claimed as an original
purpose. But the fact that this theory has not been asserted creates a
similar foreseeability problem because many uses that might be eligible
under it were discovered long ago. This problem can be avoided only
if actual water use is necessary to invoke the theory, and in that case
the water right acquired would be essentially the same as one acquired
by appropriation under state law. For these reasons, this theory is
unlikely to be of practical importance.
Groundwater raises other unresolved Winters questions. Whether
there can be a Winters right in groundwater technically remains an
open question. 3 The answer will likely be yes when the requisite need
77. See Colville, 647 F.2d at 49.
78. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
79. This concept was implicitly applied in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The tribes claimed a Winters water right for a new
fishery using planted, nonindigenous fish to replace original tribal fisheries in a different watershed.
The original fisheries had been destroyed by dams. This purpose, foreseeable at the time of quantifica-
tion but not at the time the reservation was set aside, was sustained by the court. Id. at 48.
80. Report of the Special Master 98 (Feb. 22, 1982), Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
81. See supra note 79. This theory might have been an alternative basis to uphold the replace-
ment fishery, but under this theory the fishery would have had a new, later priority date.
82. 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979), overruled, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981).
83. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976). Some court opinions state that reserva-
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can be shown, and the challenge will be to define its extent. When
surface and groundwater sources form a connected system, the courts
have already recognized that a surface Winters right may be protected
against depletion by groundwater pumping.84 There is no apparent
reason why a tribe entitled to use such a surface source cannot exploit
it by means of a well. Increased efficiency will often result, to every-
one's benefit. Another circumstance in which a Winters right in
groundwater is likely to be recognized is where an underground source
is located entirely under Indian land. Many wells on the Navajo Res-
ervation tap such sources, including those used for the slurry line from
Black Mesa to Page.
Harder problems are posed when groundwater sources underlie
both Indian and non-Indian land. An absolutely prior right in any
owner would often allow that owner to preclude pumping from an
aquifer by any other party because pumping by junior owners would
cause the aquifer's water pressure or the water table to fall. Prior ap-
propriation states have recognized this problem and have either ap-
plied a different legal regime to groundwater or have modified the
prior appropriation doctrine for groundwater.8 5 Winters rights in
groundwater will require a similar accommodation. In other words,
tribes can use groundwater but will have to share it with their
neighbors.
Another issue that excites much debate is that of the priority of
Winters rights-whether the priority date should be the date a reserva-
tion was set aside or an earlier date based on original tribal title such
as time immemorial. This issue has been said to depend on the answer
to the theoretical question of who reserved the water, the United
States or the tribe or both.86 The question of who reserved the water,
however, is an irrelevant abstraction. Winters rights are implied from
a federal treaty, statute or executive order; the relevant issue is what
right federal law has recognized. When Indians were already using
water for a certain purpose at the time a reservation was set aside, the
reasonable interpretation of the federal treaty, statute or executive or-
der is to reserve that water use unimpaired. This requires that the
tion rights in groundwater exist. Eg., Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
See also Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on othergrounds, 279 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1960); 61 Interior Dec. 209 (1953); Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert
v. United States, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 388 (1978).
84. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647
F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See also United States v. Smith, 625
F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1980).
85. See Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine: The
Law and Underlying Economic Goals, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1981).
86. Eg., Note, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 375-76 (1975).
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tribe's Winters right for that purpose be accorded a priority based on
the water's first use, such as time immemorial. But when a reservation
purpose contemplates a new water use, the reasonable reading is to
imply a new reservation of water effective on the reservation date. The
great majority of Winters rights are in the latter category and should
have a reservation date priority. But in proper cases, notably those of
fisheries, the earlier priority ought to be recognized; otherwise the es-
tablishment of a reservation would impair the preexisting Indian use.
This would violate the rule that Indian laws and agreements will not
be read technically against the Indians.
This analysis is not new. It was applied in the 1935 Globe Equity
decree in Arizona. 7 The decree awarded the Pimas, who had irri-
gated their farms for centuries, a Winters right based on prior use with
a priority of time immemorial. It awarded the Apaches a reservation
priority date because their right was not in prior use.88 Although
there is controversy about the fairness of the allocations in that decree,
the decree seems clearly correct in its concept of priorities.
Finally, the hardest and most important question: Will Winters
water rights contribute to a reasonably prosperous future in Indian
country? With very few exceptions, they have not in the past. Win-
ters has mostly functioned to protect subsistence uses, for survival but
not comfort. Unfortunately, the obstacles to improvement seem as
formidable as ever. Indian nations must find development capital and
must find wise ways to use it that are suitable to their societies. The
limited development projects that the federal government attempted in
the past were often misguided schemes that could not work in the tri-
bal setting, especially projects built around allotments. 89 Increasing
demand for shared water supplies will continue to make the task ever
more difficult. The risk remains that Winters will continue to be
mostly a legal scripture for lawyers to debate like theologians.
87. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., No. 59 Globe Eq. (D. Ariz., Jun. 29, 1935).
88. Id. at 86.
89. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 134-38, 728.
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